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Michael J. Zimmerman, Ignorance and Moral Obligation, (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2014), 160 pages. ISBN: 0199688850 (hbk.). Hardback/Paperback: $55.00/–.
In 2006, Michael Zimmerman published an underappreciated paper on the nature
of moral obligation in which he argued that our moral obligations depend, not on the facts
or our beliefs, but on the evidence available to us (see “Is Moral Obligation Objective or
Subjective?” Utilitas 18, 2006, pp. 329-361). Two years later, he published a lengthy book
in which he argued more thoroughly for the same conclusion (see Living with Uncertainty:
The Moral Significance of Ignorance, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008)).
In Ignorance and Moral Obligation, Zimmerman returns to the central question of those
works to respond to objections that have been brought against the views he presented
therein. Though not without its weaknesses, Zimmerman’s new book is the most thorough
defense of what has come to be known as the Prospective View of moral obligation and as
such is a must-read for those working in normative ethics narrowly construed.
Ignorance and Moral Obligation is composed of five chapters. In the first,
Zimmerman poses the book’s central question, “What ought one to do when one doesn’t
know which of one’s options is best?” (p. 10), where ‘ought’ is supposed to express the
concept of moral obligation and by ‘best’ Zimmerman means best with respect to what
matters morally (so as not to assume consequentialism). Zimmerman then presents the four
leading answers to that question. According to the Objective View, one ought to do what is
best, even if one doesn’t know what that is. According to the Subjective View, one ought
to do what one believes is best. According to the Prospective View, which is Zimmerman’s
view, one ought to do what the evidence suggests is best. Finally, according to the
Ambiguity View, there are multiple senses of ‘ought,’ even when ‘ought’ expresses moral
obligation. On this view, although there are facts about what agents objectively ought to
do, subjectively ought to do, and prospectively ought to do, there is no fact about what
agents ought to do simpliciter, because there is simply no such notion. At the end of chapter
one, Zimmerman sets the Ambiguity View aside. Although he (hesitantly) admits that there
might be multiple senses of moral obligation, he indicates that he is interested in the sense
of moral obligation with which normative ethicists have traditionally been interested,
which he claims is the sense of moral obligation that is “of ultimate concern to the
conscientious person” (p. 33).
In chapter two, Zimmerman argues that there are two constraints that the correct
theory of moral obligation must meet, that neither the Objective nor the Subjective View
can meet them, and that the Prospective View, which can meet them, is therefore superior.
In particular, Zimmerman argues that the Subjective View fails because it rules out the
possibility that agents could be wrong about what they are morally obligated to do. Then

he argues that the Objective View fails because it entails that one who believes that it is
the correct theory of moral obligation will sometimes have to violate its dictates (i.e., do
what the theory entails is wrong) in order to act conscientiously.
As evidence for this latter claim, Zimmerman presents a case based on a wellknown example conceived by Frank Jackson (see “Decision-Theoretic Consequentialism
and the Nearest and Dearest Objection,” Ethics 101, 1991, pp. 462-463). A doctor, Jill,
must decide how to treat the skin condition of her patient, John. She has three drugs
available. She knows that one will completely cure his condition, that one will partially
cure his condition, and that one will kill him. Unfortunately, however, although she knows
which of the three drugs will partially cure John’s condition, she does not know, for either
of the remaining two drugs, whether it will cure him or kill him. Assuming that it is best to
completely cure John’s condition and that Jill knows this, then if Jill believes the Objective
View, she will believe that prescribing the drug that will only partially cure John’s
condition is wrong. But, intuitively, if she is to act conscientiously, then she must prescribe
the drug that will only partially cure John’s condition since prescribing either of the others
would be too risky. Thus, those who believe the Objective View will sometimes have to
violate its dictates in order to act conscientiously.
In chapter three, Zimmerman clarifies the Prospective View and responds to
objections to it, the most notable of which was raised by Holly Smith (see “The
‘Prospective View’ of Obligation,” Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, Discussion
Note, 2011, pp. 5-8). According to Smith’s objection, the Prospective View is no different
from the Objective View in that it entails that agents who believe it will sometimes have
to violate its dictates in order to act conscientiously.
To illustrate this, Smith presents a case similar to Jackson’s. But whereas Jackson’s
example reveals that acting conscientiously sometimes requires one to do what one knows
is suboptimal, Smith’s example reveals that acting conscientiously sometimes requires one
to do what one knows the evidence available to one suggests is suboptimal. Therefore, if
Zimmerman is correct that those who believe the correct theory of moral obligation will
never have to violate its dictates in order to act conscientiously, then the Prospective View,
as Zimmerman formulated it in his earlier works on moral obligation, must be false.
In light of Smith’s objection, Zimmerman acknowledges that he must modify the
way he formulated the Prospective View in his earlier works. Whereas before he
understood the Prospective View as maintaining that one is morally obligated to do what
the evidence available to one suggests is best, he now understands it as maintaining that
one is morally obligated to do what the evidence one possesses suggests is best. Once we
modify the Prospective View in this way, it is no longer vulnerable to this objection.
In chapters four and five, Zimmerman explores how his views on the nature of
moral obligation bear on two other debates. In chapter four, he argues that no theory of
moral obligation can be supplemented with a principle of action guidance that is more
practicable than the theory itself, and in chapter five, he argues that our moral rights depend
on the evidence that others have.
Given how much ground Zimmerman covers, there are a number of places where
one might object his arguments, but I will focus my attention on the most obvious weakness
in his argument for the Prospective View. As mentioned above, Zimmerman’s argument
for the Prospective View depends on his argument against the Objective View, and that
argument depends on the claim that acting conscientiously rules out deliberately doing

what one believes to be morally wrong (pp. 32-33). Zimmerman calls this Constraint #2
and shows that its truth entails the falsity of the Objective View by presenting the first case
above. While Zimmerman does not provide an argument for Constraint #2, it does seem
plausible, and Zimmerman leverages its plausibility against the Objective View.
Although there is nothing, in principle, wrong with this strategy, I worry that
Constraint #2 is not sufficiently compelling to stop proponents of the Objective View from
taking the opposite tack – that is, leveraging their reasons for holding the Objective View
against Constraint #2, leaving the two sides at an impasse. Having said that, I think there
are a couple of things Zimmerman could have done to make this way of responding to his
argument less attractive. First, he could have provided an argument for Constraint #2. Or,
if that was not possible, he could have identified other, more plausible constraints on the
correct theory of moral obligation that, like Constraint #2, entail the falsity of the Objective
View. For example, the claim that an individual does not deserve punishment unless he or
she has violated a moral obligation (together with plausible auxiliary premises) entails the
falsity of the Objective View, and it is, to my mind, more plausible than Constraint #2.
Additionally, Zimmerman could have spent more time undercutting the reasons people
have for holding the Objective View in the first place. Either of those changes would have
made his argument for the Prospective View more convincing.
In the end, however, the book’s virtues far outweigh its shortcomings. It is clear
and concise, especially given its impressive breadth and depth, and the arguments
Zimmerman raises and responds to will be both interesting and challenging to anyone with
a particular view of the nature of moral obligation.
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